




**ACSRT**

African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism



# MID-YEAR AFRICA TERRORISM TREND ANALYSIS

JANUARY-JUNE 2022

## 1. TABLE OF CONTENT

1. TABLE OF CONTENT .....	2
2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	3
3. INTRODUCTION.....	6
4. METHODOLOGY .....	7
5. CONTEXTUAL DEFINITION : AU/ACSRT PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM.....	8
6. TERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT .....	9
7. CONTINENTAL TERRORISM INCIDENTS MAP .....	13
8. QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: EVALUATION OF DATA TREND .....	15
8.1 Overall Continental Statistics.....	15
8.1.1 Total Terrorist Attacks and Deaths .....	15
8.1.2 Primary Targets of Attacks.....	16
8.1.3 Death by Category .....	16
8.1.3 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs).....	17
8.2 Regional Overview .....	18
8.2.1 Trends in Regional Attacks and Deaths .....	18
8.2.2 Trends Attacks by Targets and Deaths by Category .....	19
8.3 Country Profile .....	20
8.3.1 Countries with Terrorism Incidents .....	21
8.3.2 High Profile Terrorist Attacks for the Period .....	22
8.3.2 Five Most Affected Countries .....	23
8.4 Terrorist Groups Activities .....	24
8.4.1 Al-Shabaab .....	26
8.4.2 Boko Haram .....	26
8.4.3 Jama'at Nustratal-Islam wal- Muslimeen (JNIM)/ Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) .....	27
8.4.4 Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS).....	28
8.4.5 Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) .....	29
8.4.6 Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP)/ Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).....	30
8.4.7 Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah (ASWJ) .....	31
8.4.8 Other Islamic State (IS) Affiliates .....	32
8.4.9 Unidentified/Unaffiliated Groups.....	32
8.5 Focused Analysis on Epicentres .....	33
8.5.1 Sahel Belt of West Africa .....	34
8.5.2 Lake Chad Basin .....	34
8.5.3 Horn of Africa.....	34
8.5.4 Great Lakes Region .....	35
9. HISTORICAL TERRORISM TREND .....	36
10. COUNTER-TERRORISM RESPONSE GENERATION .....	38
11. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	40

## 2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**General Situation.** The period from the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2022 to 30<sup>th</sup> of June 2022 recorded 699 terrorist attacks that resulted in 5,412 deaths across Africa. In terms of monthly trend, the month of March recorded the highest number of attacks (21%), followed by June (19%). Again, in terms of resultants deaths, March recorded 24% of the total deaths, while June recorded 20% of deaths for the reported period. In comparison to the first half of 2021, the first half of 2022 witnessed rather a marginal decline in the number of terrorist attacks, but a sharp rise in the total number of deaths. The first half of 2021 registered 950 attacks that resulted in 3,883 deaths, while the first half of 2022 recorded 699 attacks that resulted in a total death of 5,412. When comparing the preceding period (2021) to the current (2022), there was a marginal decline of 26% in terrorist attacks, but a sharp increase of 40% in the number of deaths, demonstrating the increasing brutal nature of attacks within the period.

**Countries Most Affected.** The five countries most affected by terrorist attacks during the period were: Nigeria, Mozambique, DRC, Burkina Faso, and Mali (*in decreasing order*).

**Targets of Terrorist Attacks.** While 433 out of the 699 terrorist attacks were launched against Civilians, 235 targeted Military/Security Forces, 19 attacks targeted International Organizations, and 12 attacks targeted Governmental Institutions/Officials. The attacks by Ansaroul Islam, Boko Haram, ADF/ISCAP, ASWJ, and ISGS were mainly against Civilians, whilst Al-Shabaab, JNIM, ISWAP and other IS Affiliates mostly targeted Military/Security Forces.

**Weapons Used/Kidnapping.** The terrorist groups used Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) in 538 out of the 699 attacks and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were used in 105 of the attacks. A total of 51 cases of Kidnappings were recorded, in which 541 people were taken hostage with 168 captives being released.

**Deaths from Terrorists Attacks.** Out of the 5,412 deaths that were recorded during the period, 3,517 were civilians, 952 were Military/Security personnel and 943 were terrorists.

### **Casualties Inflicted by Terrorist Groups.**

**ADF/ISCAP** killed the highest number of people. The group's 34 attacks killed 480 persons (474 civilians, and 6 Military/Security Forces); **ISGS**

carried out 24 attacks and killed 416 persons (359 civilians, and 57 Military/Security Forces); **JNIM** carried out 39 attacks and killed 372 persons (232 civilians and 140 Military/Security Forces); **ISWAP** conducted 50 attacks and killed 328 persons (189 civilians and 139 Military/Security Forces); **Al-Shabaab** came across as the group with the highest number of attacks. The group carried out 64 attacks that killed 315 persons (177 Civilians and 138 Military/Security Forces); **Boko Haram** carried out 38 attacks that killed 197 persons (177 civilians and 20 Military/Security Forces); **ASWJ's** 46 attacks killed 122 persons (57 civilians and 12 Military/Security Forces); and other **IS affiliates** carried out 26 attacks and in total killed 107 persons (34 civilians and 73 Military/Security Forces); and **Ansaroul Islam** carried out one attack and killed four persons (All Civilians). **Unknown/Unidentified groups'** attacks were 378 and resulted in 2,136 deaths (1,778 civilians and 361 Military/Security Forces).

### **Casualties Sustained by Terrorist Groups.**

Al-Shabaab, JNIM, Boko Haram, ISGS, ISWAP, and JNIM suffered the highest number of casualties during the period. Military/Security forces killed 594 of Al-Shabaab fighters, 407 members of JNIM, and 378 Boko Haram terrorist members. ISGS suffered 232 deaths, ISWAP recorded 202 casualties and 158 members of ADF/ISCAP were killed. The rest are other IS Affiliates (65), ASWJ (42), and Ansaroul Islam (39). 1,175 members of unknown/unidentified groups were also eliminated within the period.

### **Focus on Epicentres.**

Out of the 699 terrorist attacks, the Sahel region recorded 179 attacks that resulted in 1,909 deaths, the Lake Chad Basin recorded 153 attacks that caused 1,229 deaths, the Great Lakes region accounted for 96 attacks and 1,013 deaths, and Horn of Africa region accounted for 71 attacks that resulted in 504 deaths during the period.

### **High Profile Attacks.**




- **02 February, Savo, Djugu, Ituri, DRC.** Armed men believed to be militants of ADF/ISCAP attacked the community killing 58 civilians and injuring another 36.
- **02 May, El Baraf, Middle Shabelle, Somalia.** Armed militants from Al-shabaab attacked the AMISOM/ATMIS military base. At least

33 people were killed including 30 soldiers of Burundian nationality. The Security forces, in reprisal attacks, also killed about 20 militants.


- **05 June, Owaluwa, Owo, Ondo, Nigeria.** Gunmen attacked a St Francis Xavier Catholic Church during mass. At least 50 people including women and children were killed. The Federal government blamed ISWAP for the attack.
- **11 June, Seytenga, Seno, Burkina Faso.** Armed individuals attacked a town, near the border with Niger, accusing its inhabitants of collaborating with the security forces. At least 100 civilians were killed in the attack which is believed to have been carried out by ISGS.
- **18 June, Diallassagou, Bankass, Mopti, Mali.** Armed men on motorcycles raided several villages in the region and killed over 132 civilians. The Government blamed the attack on Katiba Macina militants - an affiliate of JNIM, although group has denied responsibility.

**Counter-Terrorism Response.** CT operations resulted in the neutralizing of 2,370 terrorists. Four Military/Security Forces died during those operations across the continent.

**Conclusion/Recommendations.** There has been resurgence of terrorist and violent extremists' activities, resulting in continued devastating atrocities against civilians, security agencies, and critical infrastructure. The groups demonstrated cohesion and exhibited great capability of momentum along their mobility corridors and within the respective territories they control. Despite the numerous CT efforts by state authorities, terrorist structures seem to be resilient. Mobilising political will through sustainable financing and bolstering the morale of the deployed troops could help nip terrorism in the bud. In addition to enhancing CT operations across the continent, preventative approaches and mechanisms that seek to build the resilience of local communities by addressing their vulnerabilities could go a long way to deny terrorist and violent extremist groups their freedom of space and movement, thereby culminating into degrading the groups capabilities and cohesion to launch attacks.




### Type of Attack




■ SALW ■ IED ■ Mixed (SALW & IED) ■ Kidnapping

### Number of Attacks Per Region



### Number of Deaths Per Region



### 3. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is a usurper of human security. Insurgency, violent extremism, and itself have continued to be the primary threats to peace, security, national stability, and development on the African continent. The geography of terrorism and insurgency in Africa has dramatically increased over the past decade and, in more particular, the last five years. Regions that previously did not perceive the seriousness of the threat, or were considered to be immune from terrorism, have been targeted by terrorist groups. The threats have remained resolute both in intent and capability, with growing confidence and cohesion in the launching of devastating attacks on civilians, security forces, and critical infrastructure across the continent. The terrorism phenomenon has developed into a complex mix of ideology-driven acts of violence, transnational organized crime, banditry, and insurgency. This is manifested in the multiplicity of armed groups with varying motives and trajectories that are spreading and unleashing violence in Africa.

The International Community, Regional Organizations, Governments, Military, Intelligence and Security Agencies, Civil Society, and Local Communities have all come to terms with the fact that no country or community is immune to the threat of terrorism and that a collaborative whole-of-society approach is required to effectively address the phenomenon. The African Union Commission (AUC), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Regional Mechanisms (RMs), and Member States, with the support of international development partners, continue to exercise various strategic and operational initiatives at the national, regional, continental and international levels to mitigate the situation. In spite of these combined efforts, the threat continues to mutate with new variants of inter-community massacres, violent conflicts between herders and sedentary farmers, and a gradual but persistent expansion into new territories by Terrorist and Violent Extremist groups who now have presence in all regions of the continent. In the affected areas, the situation undermines the confidence of local populations in the ability of their governments and military to protect them against attacks by the terrorist groups. Local populations in a number of the affected areas therefore live in an environment of absolute insecurity and are at the mercy of the Terrorist and Violent Extremist groups.

The susceptibility of African countries to the threat of terrorism is due to multifaceted issues including weak institutions, porous borders, historical grievances, political exclusion, and lack of economic opportunities, among many others. These factors have acted as catalysts for extremist ideologies to emerge and fester in parts of the continent. Terrorism could thus be viewed as deriving from multifactorial and extremely diverse dimensions which do not lend to prediction by one single variable. Although collaborative efforts are delivering some effective preventative and counter-measure responses, terrorist and violent extremist organizations continue to hold considerable initiative. This is evident in the sustained attacks by terrorist groups causing debilitating harm and destruction to lives and properties. The effort by governments to counter the message of the terrorist groups, that they have an alternative to provide solutions to the grievances of local communities and improve their well-being, has thus been considerably challenged by the inconsistency and inability of the governments to address the expectations or at least provide the basic requirements of the local communities. The efforts have not been able to yield the expected results due to the relatively weak national economies of many AU Member States and the continued prevalence of several structural and governance gaps that tend to make it rather very challenging to speed up the creation of the necessary socio-economic conditions that could prevent the spread and influence of terrorist and violent extremist groups. Under the circumstances, the expectations of the local communities that the respective governments would ensure their peaceful existence tends to be considerably undermined in those areas where the groups operate.

In the year 2022, the situation shows no sign of improvement. The deteriorating terrorism threat across Africa is evidenced by the increasingly complex and sophisticated attacks launched by terrorist and violent extremist groups. Against this background, the 2022 Mid-Year Africa Terrorism Trend Analysis Report considers the activities of terrorist and violent extremist groups for the first half of 2022, with the view of taking stock of the general terrorism situation and providing policy recommendations aimed at ameliorating the terrorism and violent extremism threats in Africa.

#### 4. METHODOLOGY

In line with its mandate to assist African Union (AU) Member States (MS), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) to build their Counter-Terrorism capacities and to Prevent Violent Extremism, the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) has developed tools that enable it to collect, analyse, process, and disseminate information on terrorism-related incidents occurring in Africa. The data collected for this report is, therefore, limited to open-source information, field missions' reports, as well as data received from ACSRT Focal Point Community from all 55 Member States of the African Union (AU). The data are collected, categorized, and stored in the ACSRT Database in conformity with the definition of terrorist acts as defined by the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. The AU, in its **1999 OAU CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND COMBATING OF TERRORISM, Article 1, paragraph 3, (a) and (b), and Article 3**, defines what constitutes a **Terrorist Act**. The ACSRT and, therefore, this Mid-Year Africa Terrorism Trend Analysis defer to this definition.

The ACSRT maintains a robust database that stores information on terrorism, more specifically, on terrorist groups, their leaders and members, and activities. It also avails this information to the African Union Commission, the African Union Member States, Regional Economic Communities, and relevant Regional Mechanisms. In the framework of its Continental Counter-Terrorism Early Warning System (ACSRT CT-CEWS), information for the Database is collected by the ACSRT Situation-Room using the Africa Media Monitor (AMM) developed in collaboration with the

African Union Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) Situation-Room in the AU Commission and the European Union Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) for advanced web mining and information extraction. With the AMM, the ACSRT Situation Room scans and accesses over 1400 websites 24/7 and retrieves real time open-source information on terrorist incidents. The Centre also stores terrorism-related information received from Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and relevant Regional Mechanisms (RMs) based on existing cooperation agreements. The AU Continental Early Warning Situation-Room and reports from AU Field Missions and other field missions are also sources of information.

Data quality management is carried out based on internationally accepted data quality metrics to ensure data integrity is not comprised. Information validity and reliability, and source reliability and credibility based on internal standard operating procedure (SOP) for information gathering were adhered to. To ensure validity, credibility, and reliability of the data collected, the Centre validates all accessed terrorism incidents from the ACSRT National and Regional Focal Points. The Focal Points are the institutions in AU Members States and RECs/RMs designated to collaborate and share terrorism, violent extremism, Counterterrorism and Counter Violent Extremism-related information with the ACSRT. In accordance with its mandate, the information validated by the ACSRT on the number of attacks, deaths, and injuries recorded are considered as the official data for the ACSRT Database irrespective of other conflicting figures from other sources and databanks.

## 5. CONTEXTUAL DEFINITION : AU/ACSRT PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM

Terrorism has become one of the worst security challenges for many countries in the world. Due to the threat that terrorism poses to international peace and security, it has attracted a lot of attention globally. Although there are international instruments which condemn terrorism, repress specific terrorist acts, and call for its suppression and elimination, there remains the primary challenge of a lack of a universally accepted legal definition for terrorism. The lack of specificity in definition has continued to pose the risk of non-standardized, unbalanced, insufficient or incorrect application and implementation of counter terrorism measures. It also poses interoperability problems among security, law enforcement, and intelligence institutions of neighbouring states and regions.

There is a long-standing consensus in the academic community over the disagreement surrounding the conceptual and operational definition of terrorism. Both the theoretical conceptualization and the empirical manifestation of terrorism are highly contested based on state, national, political, geopolitical, religious, and even ideological constellations, thus giving rise to not one but many manifestations of terrorism, differing from one region to another, one sub-region to another and one country to another.

Terrorism is subjective concept that has different meanings for different people. Its definition is constantly evolving as it manifests itself in diverse ways across various parts of the world, exploiting new vulnerabilities, technologies, and approaches. Therefore, in planning programmes and initiatives targeted at the concept, it is important to understand and be sensitive to the disparate ways in which such terminology is used and understood in different localities. That said, at the policy level, it is vital to develop a common definition for the various stakeholders to work together in a coordinated and effective manner. The definition also determines the appropriate and international acceptable responses and sets Member States obligations. This report recognises the fact that different countries and regions have specific definitions of terrorism as stated in their various counter terrorism and preventing and countering violent extremism frameworks. While the definitions are just general for the purposes of achieving a common operational

understanding of them on Counter Terrorism and PCVE efforts on the African Continent, this report applies the OAU and AU definitions in cases where respective terms have been defined by the continental organization.

Notwithstanding the lack of a universal definition of terrorism, article **1 paragraph 3(a) and (b), and Article 3** of the 1999 [OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism](#), defines what constitutes a **terrorist act**. Accordingly, Article **1 (a)** defines a “**Terrorist act**” as “any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity, or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:

- (i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles.
- (ii) or disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency;
- (iii) or create general insurrection in a State.

**1(b)** any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii). **Article 3 (1)**. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, the struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression, and domination by foreign forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts. **Article 3(2)**. Political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other motives shall not be a justifiable defense against a terrorist act.”

The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) is guided by this definition in its operations and, by extension, in this Africa Terrorism Trend Analysis Report.



## 6. TERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT

Across the continent, there has been resurgence of terrorist and violent extremist activities, resulting in continued devastating atrocities against civilians, security agencies, military establishment, and critical infrastructures. From the Lake Chad Basin (LCB), Sahel belt of West Africa, East and Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes Region, and North Africa, the Maghreb right to the Southern Africa Region, terrorist and violent extremist groups escalated the level of the complexity and sophistication of attacks. The groups demonstrated cohesion and dexterity and exhibited great capability of momentum along their mobility corridors and within the respective territories they control.

Accordingly, terrorist groups continued to expand their geographical reach beyond areas originally operated, thereby recording incidents in national territories that, hitherto, were spared of terrorist attacks. The emergence of terrorist attacks in coastal West African States, particularly Northern Benin and Togo by JNIM; the continued activities of Boko Haram and ISWAP into new states of Nigeria including Niger, Ondo, Kogi, Kebbi, and Abuja; the resurgence of Islamic State atrocities in the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt; the devastating complex attacks of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya; the renewed sophisticated attacks against civilians and security forces by ADF/ISCAP in the North Kivu and Ituri Provinces of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); the resurgence of IS-linked ASWJ attacks in the Northern Mozambique Province of Cabo Delgado coupled with Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that could lead to Terrorism (VERLT) activities in South Kivu Province of DRC; and the expansion of Separatist attacks into Far North Region of Cameroon lend credence to the resurgence and expansionary trend of terrorist and violent extremist attacks across Africa. The groups appear to be executing a ground strategy of expanding their geographical reach, with the strategic intent of controlling ungoverned swaths of national territories to run criminal economies in order to sustain their violent hostilities, and to the benefit of local communities and populations that are sympathetic to their cause. The violence has created humanitarian catastrophe across the continent thus compounding the already existing humanitarian crises caused by environmental crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic and the global economic recession.

In comparison with the first half of 2021, the first half of 2022 witnessed rather a marginal decline in the number of terrorist attacks, but a sharp rise in the total number of deaths. While the first half of 2021 registered 950 attacks which resulted in 3,883 deaths, the first half of 2022 recorded 699 attacks and a total death of 5,412. When comparing the preceding period (2021) with the current (2022), there was a marginal decline of 26% in terrorist attacks, but a sharp increase of 39% in the number of deaths thereby demonstrating the more brutal nature of terrorist attacks within the first half of the year. The pattern relating to primary targets and the category of deaths remained same in both periods, however, the type of attacks changed slightly in some regions especially West Africa and North Africa. Terrorist groups in North and West Africa have developed manufacturing capabilities of IEDs and used such means to launch devastating attacks against civilians and security forces.

**Sahel Belt of West Africa.** The Sahel Belt of West Africa became the hotspot of complex and sophisticated attacks for the period under review. The complexity of attacks within the tri-border area of Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger (*Liptako-Gourma*) contributed largely to the increased terrorist activities in the region. *The Liptako-Gourma region* - an area covering the Tillaberi region of Niger; the Mopti, Gao, and Menaka regions of Mali; and the Sahel, Nord, Est, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions of Burkina Faso - remains the driving force behind the rising violent activities in the Sahel. The rampant terrorist attacks in the Liptako-Gourma and more precisely in the *Gao region* (around the commune of *Tessit*) demonstrates the freedom of movement that terrorist groups, JNIM (the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims) and the Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS) enjoy within their mobility corridors. In this area, inhabitants of several villages such as *Tadjalalt, Tinagghy, Bakal* or *Kaygouroutan* have been forced to flee their homes.

The withdrawal of the *Barkhane* troops Takuba Forces from Mali have created a security vacuum and bolstered the moral and impetus of terrorist groups to intensify their operations that might result in ease of movement. Undoubtedly, terrorist attacks are expected to continue apace or even increase. Ostensibly, the decrease in military pressure will

further cause a rise in militancy while a decrease in military pressure against the hegemony of JNIM and ISGS will allow the groups to further consolidate their control and complicate efforts by the State Security Apparatuses to re-establish control of the affected areas. In order to reverse the trend, the affected States may have to develop the ability to alter the strategic trajectory of the terrorist groups by operational raids, targeted strikes, and other military operations to serve as tactical and operational disruptors to militant groups. An innovative and out-of-the-box thinking approach that have the propensity to nip terrorism and violent extremism in the bud could help at this crucial moment.

**Burkina Faso** saw high levels of violence as terrorists expanded their tentacles and hostilities into previously unaffected areas. The security situation worsened, signalling a consistently deteriorating situation since the beginning of the political instability. Given the spread of terrorist activities in Burkina Faso, there is the fear that Northern Burkina Faso could become a launchpad for terrorist organisations to entrench their expansionary agenda further into coastal states of *Benin, Cote D'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo*.

In **Niger**, the growing violence is largely concentrated around *Tillaberi* and *Diffa* regions and, to a lesser extent, *Tera* and *Agadez* regions. ISGS and JNIM launched attacks on civilians and security forces in Tillaberi, Agadez, and Tera regions and, presumably so, on the Capital, *Niamey*. The hint at a possible engagement with violent extremist groups by **H.E Mohamed Bazoum, President of Niger**, if well implemented could help address local grievances and end the hostilities against civilians and security forces alike - as dialogue involving traditional authorities, youth and women groups, gatekeepers and influencers and disgruntled groups in society could be an effective alternative to kinetic operations in addressing terrorism and violent extremism.

In **Mali**, violence skyrocketed, leaving hundreds killed as terrorist groups launched multiple attacks and engaged in intense fighting with security forces, notably in central regions. Terrorist activities continue to be perpetrated by the two rival groups: ISGS and JNIM. While the withdrawal of Western Forces involved in Operation Barkhane and Takuba

from Mali may have enhanced the movement of terrorist groups, the devastating impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic, the cascading effects of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the economic sanctions imposed by ECOWAS have aggravated the deteriorating security and humanitarian crisis situations. The population, particularly the youth, thereby becomes vulnerable to terrorist recruitment drive. This further aggravates the already deteriorating security situation.

The expansion of terrorism and violent extremism into Coastal West Africa states has become real, following several attacks in Togo and Benin in the first half of the year. The attacks have considerably heightened the risk level of littoral states. Northern **Beninese** towns of *Alibori, Karimama, Dassari, and Tanguieta* - all located in the *Atacora Department* as well as *W-Arly* and *Pendjari National Parks* - were attacked within the period. Terrorists suspected to be affiliates of JNIM attacked several military and police posts causing significant number of casualties along the country's border with Burkina Faso.

**Togo**, a coastal state that has traditionally been spared of violent atrocities despite its proximity to terrorism-affected countries is now experiencing increased terrorism and violent extremism attacks. Violent Extremist groups continue to carry out attacks close to the northern borders that the country shares with Burkina Faso, Niger, and Ghana. On 10 and 11 May 2022, armed men believed to be militants of JNIM attacked a Togolese military outpost located in *Kpekpakandi*, a few kilometres away from neighboring Burkina Faso and killed eight (8) soldiers. This and many other incidents that followed have completely changed the security situations in Northern Togo, highlight a conscious desire of violent extremist and terrorist organizations to establish a presence in the country as part of a broader expansionary drive.

**Lake Chad Basin.** Terrorism activities in the region are predominantly dominated by Boko Haram and ISWAP. Attacks were recorded in Southwest Niger (*Diffa* region); Northeastern Nigeria states of Adamawa, Borno, Yobe, and Taraba; the Lake Chad area of Chad; and the Far North region of Cameroon. Following the rivalries and the fighting between ISWAP and Boko Haram in the LCB area, ISWAP appeared to have overpowered Boko Haram and taken over territories that were originally under

Boko Haram's control. Boko Haram has since begun developing operational theatres in other states of Nigeria including Niger, Kogi, and Kebbi.

Despite the resilient structures of terrorist groups within the LCB areas, the *Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)* as well as National Armies of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon have considerably degraded the capacities of Boko Haram and ISWAP in their areas of operation. The analysis of the unfolding situation in the LCB shows that there is likely to be a potential leadership crisis in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism due to the fractured and weak political leadership particularly following the demise of the Chadian President Idriss Déby Itno who was considered a CT Champion in the region. This leadership crisis could further weaken the capacity of States, especially military capabilities, currently manifesting in the diminishing momentum and optimism in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism.

The Civilian populations in **Cameroon** continue to bear the brunt of attacks by Boko Haram in the Far North region of the country. Armed Separatists expanded their violence activities into the Far North Region of the country where Boko Haram have operated for long. Security forces may have to re-strategize to effectively counter the increasing capacities of terrorist groups in the area. Enhancing the tactical operational capabilities of the deployed troops could help disrupt the groups' freedom of movement.

In **Chad**, terrorist attacks relatively remained low, though the country recorded some attacks perpetrated by ISWAP. On 07 June, ISWAP operatives activated two IEDs against an army convoy on the *Kiga-Negubu* road in which 14 Chadian Soldiers were killed and 25 others wounded. This attack was one of the most successful complex attacks against the Chadian Army in recent times. While terrorist activities have been low, violent protests in parts of the country including *Abéché city* in *Ouaddaï region* could be exploited by violent extremist and terrorist groups. Admittedly, persistent unrests create a favourable environment for terrorist and violent extremists to thrive. The government's initial initiative to consider Whole-Of-Society approach including the use of dialogue could further de-escalate the conflict. In **Niger**, the South-West region of Diffa also witnessed high volumes of

attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram and its offshoot offspring, ISWAP and caused devastating harm to the local population.

**Nigeria** was the most affected in the region and across the continent. Terrorist attacks became widespread, and the country witnessed attacks in some states that were originally not affected. On 06 June, Gunmen suspected to be ISWAP militants attacked a Catholic Church located in *Owaluwa, Owo in Ondo* state in which about 50 people including women and children were killed. The attack, which received international condemnation, is a proof of ISWAP and Boko Haram's presence in South-West states after their penetration in *Niger* and *Kogi states*. The North-eastern states of *Adamawa, Yobe, Borno, and Taraba* were heavily attacked by ISWAP and Boko Haram. The growing insurgency and banditry in North-western states of *Kaduna, Katsina, and Zamfara* continued unabated. In January 2022, the Central Government of Nigeria declared the banditry in the Northwest as terrorist acts. This was in line with the government's bid to stem the violence that has bedevilled that part of the country for years.

**East and Horn of Africa.** Al-Shabaab remains the most active terrorist group with occasional attacks from the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) in this part of Africa. The technological capabilities of Al-Shabaab to manufacture sophisticated IEDs have aided the group to perpetrate complex attacks which clearly manifested during the period under review. Pre-deployment CT training and counter-IED training for the deployed troops serving under the African Union Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) as well as the various National Armies in the region appear to be effective strategic approaches to degrading the IED manufacturing capabilities of Al-Shabaab. That notwithstanding, the resumption of Counter Terrorism operation activities by United States (US) Africa Command Forces, the enhanced capacity of the Somalia National Army with determination to defeat terrorist groups, as well tactical operational activities of AMISOM/ATMIS have limited the movement of terrorist groups within their operational zones.

In **Kenya**, the frequency of terrorist attacks within *Lamu, Mandera, and Garissa* Counties on the border with Somalia for the first quarter of 2022 was alarming. However, the intensity and frequency of

terrorist attacks reduced drastically in the second quarter. Kenya Defense Forces intensified its patrols in preparation for the country's general elections to be held in August 2022, and resultantly several Al-Shabaab attacks were thwarted, and weapons were recovered. The period also witnessed worsening longstanding intercommunal conflicts between Kikuyu and Swahili communities owing to elections for Lamu County governor.

**Somalia** experienced increased violence emanating from election crisis with al-Shabaab exploiting the situation targeting politicians and disrupting elections preparations as well as voting. Several mortar rockets were launched at different places in Barawe city including voting centres, killing four (4) people. While the Somalia National Army (SNA) and troops of AMISOM/ATMIS recorded some counter terrorism operational successes against the group, attacks from the group have been widespread across the country, and the capital Mogadishu has not been spared. Notably, on 23 March 2022 in *Beledweyne, Hirshabelle*, al-Shabaab exploded a car bomb outside the main hospital where the injured in an earlier suicide bombing were being taken for treatment resulting in 156 casualties (48 deaths and 108 injuries).

**Central Africa and the Great Lakes Region.** The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) - now operating under the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) - remains the most active and well-known terrorist group in this part of Africa. Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that could Lead to Terrorism (VERLT) is a major concern in the region, as many rebel groups, separatist movements, and violent extremist groups are present in neighbouring countries including Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), and the DRC. These groups continue to generate insecurity, thereby undermining peace, security, stability, and hampering development in the region.

Civilian population suffered the brunt of ADF/ISCAP attacks in the **DRC** thus posing further security and developmental challenges to local communities already impoverished by long-standing unresolved conflicts. Although the three provinces of *Ituri, South-Kivu, and North-Kivu* were the hotspots of violence in the DRC, Ituri recorded the most despicable attacks from ADF/ISCAP during the period under review. The presence of the Ugandan

troops since the beginning of December 2021 has boosted efforts to bring stability in eastern DRC by gaining ground in areas where ADF violence was rampant along the Uganda-Congo border. The East African Community (EAC) meeting held in June 2022 in Nairobi has also taken a decision to deploy a Standby Force (EACSF) to further stabilise the situation in the Eastern DRC. While such deployment could prove beneficial in combative situations, on-going peace talks between government and armed groups should be vigorously pursued as a viable alternative to achieving lasting peace, stability, resilience, and security.

In **CAR**, several people were killed including security officials in various attacks perpetrated by violent extremist and rebel groups in areas such as *Bangui, Ouaka, Haute-Kotto, Ouham-Pende and Mbomou*. Armed Separatists attacked security posts and civilians and extended their atrocities beyond South-West and North-West Regions into the littoral region of **Cameroon**. **Burundi** also recorded one (1) terrorism-related incident within the period. On 17 April, at Alpha Hotel located in Kirundo, Burundi, an unidentified gunman threw a grenade that killed one person and injured three others.

**North Africa and the Maghreb.** There is resurgence of Islamic State (IS)-affiliated groups' activities across the region. The Libyan National Army (LNA) continues to battle IS cells in southern **Libya** amid repeated attacks from the group in different parts of the country. Libya is at a perilous crossroad owing to a protracted political impasse which has weakened the coordinated efforts required to fight IS groups. Terrorist activities were recorded in **Egypt's** Sinai Peninsula with Islamic State-affiliated militants orchestrating their deadliest attack on the army in two years, killing a dozen soldiers. For instance, on 07 May, in *Qantara, Bir al-Abd* located in the Sinai Peninsula, IS-affiliated militants attacked a military post killing at least seventeen (17) soldiers and injuring five (5) others. Also, on 11 May, in *Rafah*, Sinai Peninsula, IS operatives attacked an air checkpoint, killing at least 12 soldiers.

The Sinai Peninsula has been relatively calm for several months. The Egyptian Army succeeded in significantly weakening the group, which translated to the near failure by IS elements to launch significant attacks in Sinai for several months. Nevertheless, the latest attacks and kidnappings give

rise to fears that IS could escalate its atrocities. There is an urgent need to interrogate the recent resurgence to understand what is emboldening the group's momentum and resilience. The Egyptian government has rigorously bidden for investment in the Sinai in an effort to encourage the population that had fled the area due to IS activities to return. The resurgence, if not reversed, could derail the efforts of the government, and put local economic development initiatives in shambles. In **Tunisia**, a suspected armed terrorist opened fire on police near National Guard Barracks located in Kairouan on 20 March 2022. Security forces repulsed the attack, and no casualty was recorded.

**Algeria**, which has so far been largely successful in its strategic counter terrorism operations, begun witnessing attacks believed to have been perpetrated by Al-Qaeda affiliate group - Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). On January 28, 2022, two (2) Algerian soldiers were killed in a fight with suspected AQIM militants in *Hassi Tiririne region* near the border with Niger. Similarly, on 20 March, three (3) Algerian soldiers were killed in a clash with a terrorist group on the border strip of *Timiaouine region* in *Bordj Badji Mokhtar*, a village along the border with Mali. Despite the long-term gradual decline of AQIM's capabilities as a result of the military destruction of terrorist cells and arrest of terrorist elements leading to recovery of large volumes of ammunitions and equipment, the militants continue to have the ability to acquire military grade arms within the country. This ability could be linked to several factors including vast and porous borders that the country shares with Mali, Libya, and Niger. This borderline constitutes an integral perforated strip that facilitates the movement of arms smugglers and proliferators.

**Southern Africa Region.** Terrorism in the region is predominantly dominated by Islamic State (IS)-linked Al Sunnah Wal-Jumma (ASWJ) operating in the northern **Mozambican** Province of *Cabo Delgado* with spillovers into southern **Tanzania**. Within the period, insurgents advanced into the southern districts of Cabo Delgado province, launching attacks in areas previously unaffected by the nearly five-year

old insurgency. *Ancuabe* and *Chiure* districts within Cabo Delgado began witnessing attacks in June 2022. Further, *Nampula* province suffered its first attack since the start of the conflict, when insurgents attacked a village and beheaded a civilian. The movement of insurgents into new operational corridors could be pressure from counter terrorism offensives hence the group retreats to these areas for havens. The fear, however, is that if the terrorists succeed in Mozambique, they can use the country as a launchpad to attack other countries in the region. Mobilising the political will to contain the terrorist threats in Cabo Delgado should, therefore, be treated as urgent priority among the political leadership in the region.


Despite the series of counter terrorism operational successes of the Mozambican security forces and intervening forces, the on-going insurgency seems to be buoyant. The fact that insurgent groups appear to enjoy apparent freedom of movement within Northern Mozambique reflects a minimal level of strategic coordination between the deployed international forces, and the National Armed Forces that are each responsible for their own operational areas. Coordination between Rwandan security forces, Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) Forces, and Mozambican forces operating whether within the same theatre or different, must be enhanced. With the presence of multiple foreign military deployments in Mozambique, establishment of a Joint Command and Control Centre could assist in enhancement of coordination and prevention of duplication of efforts. The AU pledged during its Extraordinary Summit on Terrorism held on 28 May 2022 in Malabo, to deploy African Standby Force (ASF) in Northern Mozambique. Within the period also, Italy, Sweden, and Lithuania joined the European Union Military Training Mission in Mozambique in the context of the fight against terrorism thus increasing the number of EU countries in Mozambique to fourteen. These kinetic militaristic approaches if combined with local community-based violent extremism prevention initiatives could help defeat terrorism in Northern Mozambique.

7. CONTINENTAL TERRORISM INCIDENTS MAP



AFRICAN UNION

### Map of Terrorism related Attacks in Africa, January - June 2022



## 8. QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: EVALUATION OF DATA TREND

### 8.1 Overall Continental Statistics


#### 8.1.1 Total Terrorist Attacks and Deaths

During the period from **1st January to 30th June 2022**, a total of **699** terrorism incidents including 51 cases of kidnapping were recorded, resulting in **5,412** terrorism-related deaths. Within the same period, **1,031** people were injured during the attacks (See Graph 1). The month of March recorded the highest number of attacks (21%), followed by June (19%). Again, in terms of resultant deaths, March recorded 24% of the total deaths, while June recorded 20% of deaths for the reported period (See Graph 2).


From the above data trend, there is a general fluctuation in monthly attacks and associated deaths. Attacks and corresponding deaths peaked at the end of each quarter (*March for Quarter 1 and June for Quarter 2*). The data also shows a high lethality rate of approximately 8 deaths per attack within the period. This presupposes that terrorist groups are becoming more brutal in their attacks. It is instructive to note that the available data further suggests at least 4 terrorist attacks each day for the first half of 2022, and that at least 30 people died of terrorism each day in Africa for the first six months of the year.

Most of the complex attacks for the period happened in the month of March and June. For example, ISGS on 04 March in Mondoro located in Mopti Mali attacked a military base, killing 27 soldiers and injuring 33 others. Security forces in a reprisal attack killed 70 terrorists. On 09 March, at Tamalat and Insinane located in Menaka also in Mali, armed men suspected to be members of ISGS attacked the villages killing a total of 62 people. The June 5 attack by ISWAP on Catholic church killed over 50 Christians in Ondo, Nigeria. Further, on 11 June, ISGS killed over 100 people in Seno, Burkina Faso, followed by the 14th of June attack by JNIM in Tillaberi Niger in which 58 people died. Following that, JNIM killed over 132 people in Mopti Mali on the 18th of June. These incidences and others accounted for the high number of attacks and fatalities recorded in March and June for the period under review.

Graph 1: Attacks and Deaths- January-June 2022



Graph 2: Trend in Continental Attacks and Deaths - January-June 2022



### 8.1.2 Primary Targets of Attacks

Most attacks (433; 62%) were against Civilian targets, 235 (31%) were against Military/Security forces, 19 (3%) were against International Organizations, while 12 (2%) targeted Government Institutions/Officials (See Graph 3).

Consistently, Civilians and Security forces are mostly the targets of terrorist attacks. Civilian vulnerabilities to attacks are due to the inability of security forces to protect them from terrorist attacks. Civilians across many parts of Africa where terrorism occurs have been summarily executed for collaborating with security agencies. This rampant situation could be attributed to failure of intelligence gathering, processing, and timely dissemination as well as the inability of security agencies to protect whistleblowers. The lack of protection of whistleblowers who divulge information to the security forces continue to undermine the relationship between local population and government forces. Local communities and the population remain key in defeating insurgent groups and detecting and reporting their movement particularly along border communities. Whistleblower protection must be enhanced, and community members must be trained on how to securely provide information without endangering themselves.


Attacks on vulnerable targets, particularly places of worship, became rampant. Local Authorities including Leaders of churches may have to enhance the security of places of worship and ensure the protection of worshippers. For International organisations, MINUSMA in Mali and the AMISOM/ATMIS in Somalia came under heavy attacks. About 30 soldiers of Burundian nationality were killed by Al-Shabaab. MINUSMA, whose operations do not include counter terrorism, continues to suffer from terrorist activities. An Egyptian contingent serving under MINUSMA suffered a significant number of casualties as about 7 soldiers were killed within the period, increasing the number of Egyptian contingents that have so far been attacked in Mali for this year.

### 8.1.3 Death by Category


Of the registered 5,412 deaths, 3,517 were civilians, 952 were Military/Security Forces, while 943 were terrorists. While civilians continue to bear the brunt of terrorist activities, the number of

men in uniform that fell on the battlefield is worrisome. The number suggests that every day in Africa at least 5 security personnel are killed by terrorist groups. This is not good for the moral of the deployed troops and those at the rear. Enhancing the operational and intelligence capabilities of the deployed troops, through counter terrorism pre-deployment training and retooling of the contingents on the battlefield, could go a long way to reduce the number of fatalities suffered by the security forces.

**Graph 3: Primary Targets - January-June 2022**



**Graph 4: Deaths by Category - January-June 2022**





### 8.1.3 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)

Attacks using Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) were by far the most common type of attacks, as they accounted for **77%** of total attacks and resulted in **4,780** deaths. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were used in **15%** of the attacks and led to **526** deaths, Mixed (SALWs and IEDs) accounted for **1%** of the attacks causing **91** deaths, while Kidnappings registered **7%** of attacks resulting in **15** deaths. Most terrorist groups in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, Great Lakes Region, and Northern Mozambique attacked using SALW. However, in the East and Horn of Africa, IEDs constituted the major means by which terrorist groups attacked their targets.


The easy access to arms and ammunitions by terrorist groups require some situational assessment in several countries currently facing the threat of terrorism and violent extremism. The proliferation of **SALWs** mostly due to the porosity of borders, trafficking by transnational organized criminal networks groups, and massive stockpile looting following attacks on military installations have contributed significantly to the illicit proliferation of SALWs in frequency and intensity by terrorists. The sizes, portability, and ease of maintenance of SALWs have made these weapons attractive to non-state actors hence increased illicit circulation. They require comparably minimal training, are readily available on the market, and are more affordable. Proper monitoring of the importation and use of SALWs, availability of database on SALWs at the national levels, as well as disruption of illegal routes

for arms trade and trafficking could significantly reduce the illicit proliferation and circulation of SALWs.

The use of **IEDs** to launch attacks has become more widespread across the continent. Areas where terrorist groups had not made use of IEDs have recorded their use. The easy-to-make nature of IEDs, their accessibility, and ready availability of materials for such devices and transfer of technology in the manufacturing of IEDs among terrorist groups could account for the widespread use of IEDs across the continent. Degrading the technological and manufacturing capabilities of Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa could possibly curtail the transfer of such capabilities among terrorist groups on the continent. Also, pre-deployment trainings on the technical identification and destruction of IEDs should form an important component of contingent's deployment for peace keeping and peace support operations.

**Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR)**, which has become a major source of financing for violent extremism and terrorism, appears to gain ground across many parts of the continent. Kidnapping predominantly featured in terrorist attacks that took place in North-western Nigerian States of Katsina, Kaduna and Zamfara; Ituri and North Kivu Provinces of DRC; Sinai Peninsula of Egypt; Diffa region of Niger; and Far North Region of Cameroon. A training program on preventing and denying the benefits of KFR to terrorists could help change the trajectory of the terrorism situation.

**Graph 5: Attacks and Deaths by Means of Attack – January to June 2022**




## 8.2 Regional Overview

### 8.2.1 Trends in Regional Attacks and Deaths


At the regional level, **West Africa** recorded the highest number of terrorist attacks. The region recorded 333 attacks that resulted in 3,189 deaths. *Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo* were the attacked regional countries with Burkina Faso experiencing a rather sharp increase in the number of attacks during the period. The region accounted for almost 48% and 59% of attacks and deaths in Africa for the period respectively. The escalated number of attacks and deaths in West Africa is attributed to the renewed attacks by terrorist groups in the Sahel. ISGS, ISWAP and JNIM appeared to enjoy some freedom of movement and launched complex and highly devastating attacks against civilian and security forces particularly within the *Liptako-Gourma* area. These groups remained resilient within the reporting period.

Next to West Africa, the **Central Africa region** recorded a combined 165 terrorist attacks resulting in 1,299 deaths in *Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)*. **Southern Africa** recorded 100 attacks that resulted in 296 deaths, will all the region's terrorist acts having occurred in the Cabo Delgado province in the North of *Mozambique*. Daesh (IS) has claimed responsibility for a number of these attacks in Mozambique through crediting its affiliate group, the Al Sunnah Wal-Jummah (ASWJ), for carrying out the attacks. **East Africa** region recorded 72 attacks that resulted in 505 deaths in *Burundi, Kenya, and Somalia*. **North Africa** recorded 30 terrorist attacks and 123 deaths which occurred in *Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia* (See Graphs 6, 7, 8, and 9).


**Graph 6: Regional Breakdown of Attacks - January-June 2022**




**Graph 7: Regional Breakdown of Deaths - January-June 2022**



**Graph 8: Trends in Regional Attacks - January-June 2022**



**Graph 9: Trends in Regional Deaths - January-June 2022**




### 8.2.2 Trends in Attacks by Targets and Deaths by Category


Consistent with the continental trend, most of the terrorist attacks in almost all regions targeted civilians mostly except North Africa where Security forces were the targets of most attacks (See Graph 10). In terms of deaths also, civilians bear the brunt of terrorist hostilities, except North Africa where Military/Security casualties exceeded that of civilians (See Graph 11). Given that, MINUSMA and AMISOM/ATMIS are in West Africa and East Africa respectively, these regions recorded almost all the

attacks against international organisations on the continent. Also, government officials and institutions in West and East Africa regions dominated the targets of terrorist attacks on the continent. Even though attacks in other regions except North Africa targeted civilians the most, there were significant attacks against military/security targets in all regions. The casualties suffered by the security forces in all regions cannot be over emphasised.

**Graph 10: Target of Attack by Region - January-June 2022**



**Graph 11: Regional Deaths by Category - January-June 2022**



## 8.3 Country Profile


### 8.3.1 Countries with Terrorism Incidents

For the period under review, 18 out of the 55 countries in Africa recorded incidents related to terrorist attacks. Only one country (**Tunisia**) recorded an attack with no deaths. The period witnessed deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso, DRC, Egypt, Mali, Mozambique, and Nigeria. In **Burkina Faso**, a total of 92 attacks were recorded, resulting in 809 deaths. Attacks and deaths in the first half of 2022 have been highly lethal. Attacks have also spread into areas that were previously unaffected. There appears to be resurgence of terrorist activities in the Sinai Peninsula of **Egypt**. The Sinai Peninsula which has been put under control by the Egyptian Army began witnessing complex attacks against security forces. The situation in the **DRC**, has not been improved. 1,049 people were killed in the country from 95 attacks. In **Mali**, terrorist attacks skyrocketed, leaving many civilians and security forces killed. Attacks in Mali were more lethal, as 871 people were killed from 58 attacks. **Nigeria** came across as the country with the highest number of attacks and deaths for the period. Attacks have spread into new States including the Capital Abuja, Kebbi, Kogi, Niger, and Ondo. 128 attacks killed 1,229 people in the country. Insurgents in Northern **Mozambique** also began attacking previously unaffected provinces

including Nampula province. The country recorded 100 attacks in which 296 people were killed, mostly civilians.

**Algeria**, notably, faced heightened terrorist threat from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) despite effective counter-insurgency operations by the Algerian National Army. On 28 January, two Algerian soldiers were killed in a firefight with suspected AQIM terrorists in Hassi Tiririne region near the border with Niger. Two (2) of the militants were also eliminated. Similarly, on 20 March, three (3) Algerian soldiers were killed in a clash with a terrorist group on the border strip in the Timiaouine region in Bordj Badji Mokhtar near the border with Mali. Terrorist attacks declined in **Somalia** and **Kenya** for the second quarter due to intensive counter terrorism operations. **Togo**, a coastal state that has been spared of terrorist attacks despite its proximity to terrorism-affected countries, began experiencing attacks. On 10 and 11 May 2022, armed men believed to be militants of JNIM attacked a Togolese military outpost located in *Kpekpakandi*, near border with Burkina Faso and killed eight (8) soldiers. Then on 16 June, gunmen attacked an army post in *Goulingoushi*, a town in Savanes region in the far northwest near the border with Burkina Faso and Ghana. Other affected countries include Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Libya, and Niger.

**Graph 11: Regional Deaths by Category – January to June 2022**



**Table 1: Detailed Records of Countries – January to June 2022**

No	Country	Attacks	Deaths	Injured	Military/Security	Civilians	Terrorists
1	Algeria	2	7	0	5	0	2
2	Benin	9	19	13	15	3	1
3	Burkina Faso	92	809	133	129	437	245
4	Burundi	1	1	3	0	1	0
5	Cameroon	51	119	88	33	77	9
6	Central African Republic (CAR)	17	95	19	35	41	19
7	Chad	2	19	30	19	0	0
8	Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	95	1049	83	78	977	6
9	Egypt	23	90	19	43	29	18
10	Kenya	18	53	20	8	45	0
11	Libya	4	5	0	5	0	0
12	Mali	58	871	133	140	520	211
13	Mozambique	100	296	18	29	201	66
14	Niger	42	233	58	69	127	37
15	Nigeria	128	1226	125	186	903	137
16	Somalia	53	451	256	130	159	162
17	Tunisia	1	0	0	0	0	0
18	Togo	2	20	13	8	0	12

### 8.3.2 High Profile Terrorist Attacks for the Period

**Table 2: The Ten Most Fatal Terrorist Attack-- January-June 2022**

No	Country	Place	Date	Group	Deaths	Description
1	Mali	Mopti	18 June	JNIM	132	Armed men on motorcycles raided several villages in the region and killed over 132 civilians. Government blamed the attack on Katiba Macina militants, an affiliate of JNIM.
2	Burkina Faso	Seno	11 June	ISGS	100	Armed individuals attacked the township in northern Burkina Faso, near the border with Niger accusing them of collaborating with the security. At least 100 civilians were killed.
3	Mali	Mopti	04 March	ISGS	97	Armed ISGS members attacked military base at <b>Mondoro</b> , killing 27 soldiers and injuring 33 others. Security forces in reprisal attack killed 70 terrorists.
4	Nigeria	Niger State	07 March	Boko Haram	67	Armed men ambushed local vigilante groups members on patrol within <b>Tungan Magajiya</b> area. At least 67 people were killed.
5	Mali	Menaka	09 March	ISGS	62	<b>09 March, Menaka.</b> Armed men suspected to be members of ISGS attacked the villages of <b>Tamalal and Insinane</b> , killing a total of 62 people, comprising 20 MSA members and 42 civilians.
6	DRC	Ituri	02 February	ADF/ ISCAP	58	Armed men attacked a community called Savo, in the district of <b>Djugu</b> killing 58 civilians, and injuring 36 others.

7	Somalia	Middle Shabelle	02 May	Al-Shabaab	53	Armed militants attacked AMISOM/ ATMIS) military base. At least 33 people were killed including 30 soldiers of Burundian nationality. Security forces in reprisal attacks also killed 20 militants.
8	Nigeria	Niger State	19 February	Boko Haram	52	Armed men suspected to be militants of Boko Haram attacked the villages of, <b>Shiroro and Munya</b> . At least 52 peoples were killed, and 42 villagers kidnapped.
9	Nigeria	Ondo	05 June	ISWAP	50	Gunmen attacked a Catholic church during mass. At least 50 people including women and children were killed, as well as many others injured. Federal authorities blamed ISWAP for the attack.
10	Somalia	Hirshabelle	23 March	Al-Shabaab	48	Al-Shabaab militants exploded a car bomb outside Beledweyne's main hospital where the injured in an earlier suicide bombing were being taken for treatment. At least 48 peoples were killed, and 108 others injured.

### 8.3.2 Five Most Affected Countries


In all, five countries namely, Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, Mozambique, and Nigeria accounted for 68 per cent (473) of the total terrorist attacks in Africa. Three out of the five countries are in West Africa (Burkina Faso, Mali, and Nigeria) and accounted for 40 per cent (278) of all attacks for the period. In terms of the deaths, the five most affected countries accounted for 79 per cent (4,254) of the total deaths for the period. The three countries from West Africa, that featured in the most affected countries accounted

for 54 per cent (2,909) of the deaths for the period. The countries most affected for the period under review are Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Mozambique (*in decreasing order*). Nigeria recorded the highest number of attacks (128) and the highest number of resultant deaths (1,229). Although Mozambique recorded the second highest number of attacks (100), the second highest number of deaths (1,029) recorded was from the DRC.

**Table 3: The Five Most Affected Countries**

Country	Total Attacks	Total Deaths	Total injured
Nigeria	128	1229	125
Mozambique	100	296	18
DRC	95	1029	83
Burkina Faso	92	809	133
Mali	58	871	133
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>473</b>	<b>4,254</b>	<b>492</b>


**Graph 12: Five Most Affected Countries**



### 8.4 Terrorist Groups Activities


The perpetuation of terrorist acts across all regions of the Continent continues to be predominantly dominated by local terrorist groups affiliated to D'aesh (IS) and/or Al-Qaida. Some armed groups which have not openly declared affiliation to D'aesh (IS) or Al-Qaida have also been responsible for a number of the recorded incidents, some of which

have undertones of intent to occupy and control territory in order to facilitate the running of criminal economies. The affiliation of the terrorist groups facilitates the provision and receipt of moral, logistical or financial support and, to some extent, encourages the participation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs).






**Graph 13: Attacks by Terrorist Groups - January-June 2022**




**Graph 14: Deaths Caused by Terrorist Groups - January-June 2022**




### 8.4.1 Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab, an al-Qaida group operating in the Horn of Africa, escalated its attacks against both civilians and security forces in many parts of Somalia including the capital, Mogadishu and Lamu, Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa counties of Kenya in the first quarter (Q1) of 2022. The second quarter (Q2), however, saw restricted movement of the group that can be attributed to the resumption of counter terrorism operations by AFRICOM, the enhanced and persistent operations by the SNA, and the coordinated response by the troops deployed under AMISOM/ATMIS. Also, the continued patrols and offensive operations along the borders with Somalia by the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) reduced the number of attacks in Kenya for Q2. Notwithstanding the disruptors to the group’s activities, the group managed to carry out some sophisticated attacks. The group carried out the highest number of attacks for the period (64) killing a total of 315 persons (See Graphs 13 and 14). The group targeted security forces in the majority of its attacks within the period (See Graph 15). In terms of TTPs, majority of Al-Shabaab’s attacks involved the use of IEDs and the group continued to exhibit its prowess over the manufacturing of IEDs. The group’s IED manufacturing capabilities require some degrading. A pre-deployment training for the deployed troops on the possible identification and destructions of IEDs in the Horn of Africa could considerably degrade the IED capabilities of Al-Shabaab. A total of 594 militants of Al-Shabaab were eliminated in reprisal attacks and CT operations.


**Graph 15: Primary Targets of Al-Shabaab**



**Graph 16: Victims Killed by Al-Shabaab**



**Graph 17: Means of Attack by Al-Shabaab**




### 8.4.2 Boko Haram


**Boko Haram**, another Al-Qaeda affiliate group which operates in Lake Chad Basin, also carried out several attacks. The group carried out 38 attacks that resulted in 197 deaths (See Graph 13 and 14). Boko Haram continues to target the civilian population (See Graph 18). Within the period, the groups’ attack in the LCB was limited to the Far North of Cameroon and to a lesser extent to South East Niger (Diffa Region). The decline in the group’s attacks may be attributed to the degrading of the group’s capability by the MNJTF and the renewed fighting with ISWAP. Having lost its operational space in the LCB, the group has begun attacking North Central Nigerian States, particularly Niger and Kogi States.

Attacks by Boko Haram have been mainly perpetrated using Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)- See Graph 20. The use of IED was not widespread in the group's attacks. However, a number of Kidnappings for Ransom (KFR) have been carried out by the group. Curtailing the arms trafficking supply routes of Boko Haram could significantly deny the group the needed logistical support required to sustain its offensive operations. The geographical expansionary drive of Boko Haram into new states needs, as a matter of urgency, to be disrupted. The gradual expansion, if allowed to fester, could become an entrenched trajectory and insurgency difficult to dislodge. Reprisal attacks and deliberate counter terrorism (CT) operations by security forces resulted in the elimination of 371 militants of Boko Haram.


**Graph 18: Primary Targets of Boko Haram**



**Graph 19: Victims Killed by Boko Haram**



**Graph 20: Means of Attack by Boko Haram**




### 8.4.3 Jama'at Nustratal-Islam wal- Muslimeen (JNIM)/ Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM)

**JNIM**, an al-Qaeda affiliate group comprising Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Macina Liberation Front (MLF), Ansarul Dine, and Al-Mourabitoun that operates in the Sahel, exhibited great momentum and carried out devastating attacks on both civilian and security forces targets. For the period, AQIM carried out two (2) attacks in Southern Algerian regions of Hassi Tiririne near the border with Niger and Timiaouine near the border with Mali. JNIM carried out 39 attacks that killed 372 persons (See Graphs 13 and 14). The group focused its attacks on the security forces, as 27 out of the group's 39 attacks targeted military/security (See Graph 21).


JNIM enjoyed some freedom of movement within its mobility corridors particularly in the Liptako- Gourma area and further expanded its activities into West African coastal states of Benin and Togo. On 11 May, suspected JNIM militants attacked a Togolese military outpost killing 8 soldiers - an attack that has changed the security situation in Northern Togo and the coastal states in general. The political instability in the Sahel and the announced drawdown and redeployment of forces involved in Operations Barkhane and Takuba have created a security vacuum which has bolstered the moral of the Sahel terrorist groups to be more brutal in their attacks. Disrupting JNIM's influence in the coastal states will have to involve some proactive PVE measures that address the vulnerabilities of local communities. In this regard, the full implementation and operationalisation of the Accra Initiative could help stabilise the situation and reduce the threat level.

JNIM made some great use of IEDs in their attacks although SALWs constituted major parts of their attacks. The porosity of borders among most countries in West Africa has contributed to the proliferation of SAWs in the Sahel.


**Graph 21: Primary Targets of JNIM**



**Graph 22: Victims Killed by JNIM**



**Graph 23: Means of Attack by JNIM**




#### 8.4.4 Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)


Like JNIM, ISGS that operates in the Sahel, also exercised a great deal of momentum, and carried out devastating attacks against civilians accused of collaborating with security forces. For the period, ISGS was more brutal and lethal in its attacks. The group killed the second highest number of persons (416) among all terrorist groups (See Graph 14). The group carried out a total of 24 attacks (See Graph 13). In terms of targets, ISGS targeted civilians more in its attacks (See Graph 24). ISGS made some extensive use of IEDs in their attacks although SALWs constituted major parts of their attacks (See Graph 26).

ISGS attacks were predominantly concentrated in the tri-border area of Liptako-Gourma and more precisely in the *Gao region* - around the commune of *Tessit* thus demonstrating freedom of movement along its mobility corridors. In this area, inhabitants of several villages such as *Tadjalalt, Tinagghy, Bakal or Kaygouroutan* have been forced to abandon their homes. ISGS terrorist attacks are expected to continue apace or even increase following the withdrawal of Western Forces involved in Operations Barkhane and Takuba from Mali. The decrease in military pressure will further cause a rise in militancy while a decrease in military pressure against the hegemony of ISGS will allow the group to further consolidate its control and complicate efforts by the States Security Apparatus to re-establish control of these areas. 232 militants of ISGS were eliminated by Security forces within the period.


**Graph 24: Primary Targets of ISGS**



**Graph 25: Victims Killed by ISGS**



**Graph 26: Means of Attack by ISGS**




**8.4.5 Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)**

Boko Haram breakaway faction and offspring, **ISWAP** operates in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) particularly in Nigeria, Niger, and Chad. ISWAP came across as the group with the second highest number of terrorist attacks for the period. The group carried out a total of 50 attacks that resulted in 328 (See *Graphs 13 and 14*) deaths comprising 189 civilians and 139 military/security forces (See *Graph 28*). The majority of ISWAP's attacks targeted Military/Security installations and personnel as 28 out of 50 attacks were of Military/Security targets while 22 were civilian targets (See *Graph 27*).


In terms of modus operandi, the group made use of both IED and SALW (See *Graph 29*). Unlike Boko Haram, ISWAP has consistently been on the drive of winning the hearts and minds of the local

population, hence the strategy of focusing its attacks on security forces instead of civilians. ISWAP dominated terrorist attacks in North-eastern Nigerian States of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, and Taraba, as well as South-eastern Nigerian region of Diffa. The group also expanded its hostilities into new States in Nigeria including Kogi, Ondo, and Kebbi. ISWAP appeared to have driven away Boko Haram in the LCB and exhibited a great level of freedom of movement within the LCB and beyond. The attack at St Francis Catholic Church in Owo, Ondo, in which suspected ISWAP militants killed over 50 people lends credence to the group's expansionary drive. CT Operations neutralised 202 militants of ISWAP.


**Graph 27: Primary Targets of ISWAP**




**Graph 28: Victims Killed by ISWAP**



**Graph 29: Means of Attack by ISWAP**



**Graph 30: Primary Targets of ISCAP/ADF**




**8.4.6 Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP)/ Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)**


ADF has been known as a terrorist group operating in the **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)**. It has carried out several violent attacks within its new denomination- ISCAP. The Islamic State (IS), in an official statement on 18 April 2019, claimed responsibility for the attack on DRC’s military base in **Bovata**, North Kivu and declared the DRC as the **“Central Africa Province of the Caliphate”** thus marking the birth of **Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP)** in the region. In July 2019, ADF pledged allegiance to IS. The Islamist ideology of ADF also gives credence to the suspicion to that ADF has been integrated into ISCAP.

The **Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)**, now operating under the **Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP)**, killed the highest number of people (480) for the period (See Graph 14), from a total of 34 attacks (See Graph 13). Contrary to JNIM and ISWAP, civilians continue to bear the brunt of ADF/ISCAP in the North-Kivu and Ituri provinces of Eastern DRC. There is the need to prioritise the protection of local population in the DRC to enable them to live in dignity, peace, and stability. Security forces in their CT operations eliminated 158 militants of ISCAP/ADF.

**Graph 31: Victims Killed by ISCAP/ADF**



**Graph 32: Means of Attack by ISCAP/ADF**



### 8.4.7 Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah (ASWJ)


The primary insurgent group in Mozambique is called Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah (ASWJ) or Ansar al-Sunna and is locally referenced as al-Shabaab. However, the group does not have any known affiliations with al-Shabaab in Somalia. The incessant terrorist acts in the Cabo Delgado Province in Northern Mozambique are perpetrated by IS-linked ASWJ. On 25 July 2019, in Makoul, a village of Cabo Delgado, ASWJ issued a statement, through IS Central media, claiming to have killed four field Intelligence Officers working for the Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM). Several other ACSRT reports indicate that there could be an operational alliance between ASWJ and ISCAP, following IS' claim of responsibility for the attack believed to have been perpetrated by ASWJ. A possible linkage of the terrorist acts occurring in Cabo Delgado with IS was established. Since then, IS social media has claimed responsibility for almost all ASWJ attacks in Mozambique.

The IS-linked ASWJ carried out a total of 46 attacks that resulted in 122 deaths within the first half of 2022 (See Graphs 13 and 14). Majority of these attacks were recorded in the Cabo Delgado Province of Northern Mozambique. Civilians in local communities were the major targets of IS-linked ASWJ attacks, as 41 out of the group's 46 attacks targeted civilians (See Graph 33). All attacks by the group were carried out using SALWs (See Graph 35). Several civilians were beheaded for collaborating with security forces. Like the targets, the majority of victims of the group were civilians, as 97 out of the 122 people that the group killed were civilians while 25 were military/security forces. Protection of the civilian population will have to be prioritized by the government to maintain or improve the level of trust between security forces and the citizens. Counter-terrorism operations in the region resulted in the killing of 42 ASWJ Militants.


For the period, ASWJ was highly brutal and lethal in its attacks. In Northern Mozambique, ASWJ appeared resilient despite waves of surrenders. The group enjoyed some freedom of movement and expanded its attacks to new areas such as the Nampula Province and Acuabe district located in Cabo Delgado province. This movement and expansions could be curtailed if the various

deployments enhance their coordination, collaboration, and intelligence sharing.


**Graph 33: Primary Targets of ASWJ**



**Graph 34: Victims Killed by ASWJ**



**Graph 35: Means of Attack by ASWJ**




### 8.4.8 Other Islamic State (IS) Affiliates


Other Islamic State (IS) Affiliates are all splinter IS-affiliated groups mainly operating in the North Africa Region including Sinai Peninsula (IS-SP-Egypt), Tunisia, and Southern Libya. The attacks by the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) were also categorized under other IS Affiliates. The Islamic State in Somalia (ISS), also known as Abna Ul-Calipha, are an IS-affiliate group that operates in the Puntland region of Somalia. During the period, its activities were restricted mainly due to the very effective airstrikes conducted by US AFRICOM against the group that disrupted the group’s activities.

**Other IS Affiliates** were brutal and very lethal in their attacks. A total of 26 attacks were carried out by such groups and resulted in 107 deaths (See *Graphs 13 and 14*). For the North Africa region, particularly the Sinai Peninsula, attacks focused on security forces (See *Graph 36*). Like the targets, Security forces bore the brunt of such groups on the continent, as 73 out of the 107 that the group killed were military/security forces while 34 were civilians (See *Graph 37*). Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) constituted the majority of means of attacks by other IS affiliates (See *Graph 38*). The resurgence of attacks in the Sinai Peninsula needs to be addressed to reassure the local population of their safety. A total of 65 militants of other IS affiliates were eliminated across the continent.


**Graph 36: Primary Targets of Other IS Affiliates**



**Graph 37: Victims Killed by Other IS Affiliates**



**Graph 38: Means of Attack by Other IS Affiliates**



### 8.4.9 Unidentified/Unaffiliated Groups

Unidentified Groups are actors of all terrorist attacks carried out by the various known terrorist groups operating in Africa, but either did not claim responsibility for the attacks, or security forces did not attribute the respective attacks to any group. Even though, the attacks might have taken place in an operational theatre of a known terrorist group, without claiming of responsibility by the group or attribution by Security Forces or ACSRT Analysts, it is left as Unidentified Groups. Such groups carried out 378 attacks that killed 2,136 people. **Ansaroul Islam**, an unaffiliated group operating in Burkina Faso carried one attack that killed four people.




### 8.5 Focused Analysis on Epicentres


For purposes of tracking the development of terrorism and violent extremism on the continent with the view to ensuring synergies in interventions aimed at reversing the growing trend of terrorism and violent extremism, some areas have been delineated and termed as epicentres of terrorist activities. For purposes of this report, the

epicentres are Sahel belt of West Africa, Horn of Africa, Lake Chad Basin, and the Great Lakes Region. A total of 499 attacks, representing 71% of all attacks for the period occurred in the above-mentioned epicentres. Also, 4,725 deaths representing 87% of total deaths for the period occurred in these areas.

**Graph 39: Distribution of Attacks in Epicentres**



**Graph 40: Distribution of Deaths in Epicentres**




### 8.5.1 Sahel Belt of West Africa

Attacks and deaths captured under the Sahel are those that occurred in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (*excluding attacks and deaths in Diffa region*). For the period under review, the **Sahel region** recorded the highest number of attacks (179) and the highest number of deaths (1,909) among the epicentres of terrorist and violent extremist activities (*See Graphs 39 and 40*). The lethality rate for the Sahel is 11 deaths per attack, higher than the general rate of 8 deaths per attack for the entire continent. Like many parts of Africa, civilians constituted the highest number of those killed in the Sahel by terrorist activities (*See Graph 41*).

For the Sahel, attacks concentrated on the Liptako-Gourma region particularly Gao, Mopti and Menaka regions of Mali, the Sahel region of Burkina Faso, and the Tillaberi region of Niger. The data trend reveals a deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel, mainly caused by JNIM and ISGS hostilities and atrocities within the Liptako-Gourma area. Transnational organised crimes appear to be fuelling terrorist activities in this part of the Sahel. JNIM and its affiliate groups as well as ISGS remain the most active terrorist group in the area for the period. Under the present circumstances, the G5 Sahel forces, which have been battling terrorist groups could further prove relevant given the drawdown of Barkhane and Takuba forces in Mali. Mobilisation of forces, including provision of logistical and financial support, could help the G5 Sahel forces weaken the hegemony of JNIM and ISGS within the Sahel region.


**Graph 41: Deaths per Category in the Sahel Region**



### 8.5.2 Lake Chad Basin

Attacks and Deaths captured under the Lake Chad Basin are those that occurred in Southeast Niger (Diffa Region), North-eastern Nigeria states of Borno, Adawama, and Yobe; Far North region of Cameroon, and South West Chad (*Lake Chad region*). Terrorist groups in the **LCB** were also brutal and lethal in their attacks. There were 153 attacks that resulted in 1,299 deaths accounting for 8 deaths per attack. Most attacks in the LCB concentrated in the North-eastern State of Borno (Nigeria), South-West Niger (Diffa Region) and Far North Region of Cameroon. Boko Haram and ISWAP are responsible for most of the attacks in this part. The MNJTF and national armies of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon continue to achieve operational successes against ISWAP and Boko Haram in LCB.

**Graph 42: Deaths per Category in Lake Chad Basin**



### 8.5.3 Horn of Africa


Attacks and Deaths captured under the Horn of Africa are those that occurred in Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia. The region recorded a total of 71 attacks that resulted in 504 deaths (*See Graphs 39 and 40*), majority of which are civilian targets and civilian casualties (*See Graph 43*). The two groups that operate in these parts of Africa are Al-Shabaab and Islamic State in Somalia (ISS). The frequency of Al-Shabaab's attacks in the **Horn of Africa** has declined considerably and this can be attributed to the resumption of Counter Terrorism operations of the United States (US) Africa Command Forces, the enhanced capacity of the Somalia National Army and improved determination to defeat terrorist

groups, as well tactical operational activities of AMISOM/ATMIS. These operations have greatly curtailed the movement of terrorist groups within their operational zones and theatres. Notwithstanding the casualties suffered by both Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS), the former, known for its capabilities to manufacture sophisticated IEDs, executed several complex IED attacks during the period under review. On 02 May in *El Baraf*, Hirshabelle, al-Shabaab militants attacked an AMISOM/ATMIS base killing at least 30 soldiers of Burundian nationality.


### 8.5.4 Great Lakes Region

Attacks and Deaths captured under the Great Lakes region are those that occurred in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania. For the period, attacks were recorded in Eastern DRC Provinces of Ituri, South Kivu, and North Kivu. There was also a single attack recorded in Burundi. In all, the region recorded 96 attacks that resulted in 1,013 deaths (*See Graph 39 and 40*). The main terrorist group operating in this area is the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), now operating under the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) banner. The civilian population continued to bear the brunt of ADF/ISCAP attacks (*See Graph 44*).

**Graph 43: Deaths per Category in Horn of Africa**



**Graph 44: Deaths per Category in Great Lakes**




## 9. HISTORICAL TERRORISM TREND

This section takes a historical trend of terrorism attacks and related deaths from the past five years, using 2017 as the base year. In term of attacks, the data shows there have been fluctuation in the number of terrorist attacks over the past five years, with 2021 recording the highest number of attacks for the Mid-Years (MY)- **See Graph 45**. The fluctuation is not surprising, as every year, different and multiple factors drive terrorism and violent extremism in Africa. Other global external factors, particularly those instigated by Al-Qaeada, and the so-called Islamic State (IS) depending on their global outlook have all affected the terrorism landscape in Africa. This is so, given that most terrorist groups operating in Africa have sworn allegiance to these global terrorist movements. Comparing the 2022 MY data with previous years, the attacks recorded for the 2022 MY is only higher than those recorded in 2017 (687) and 2018 (515) MY data. In fact, the 2022 MY is a reduction of 26% of the attacks recorded in the previous year (2021). Even though 2021 recorded the highest number of attacks when comparing Mid-Year data, 2020- a year in which COVID-19 ravaged the world recorded the highest number of terrorist attacks from the period 2017 to 2021 when full completed data (Mid-Year and Second Half of Year) is considered (**See table 4**).

In terms of deaths arising from terrorism related activities, 2022 have recorded the highest number of deaths for each MY comparing data from 2017 to 2022. The 2017 (base year) by the mid of that year recorded 2,906 deaths from terrorist attacks. Same period in 2022 recorded a total of 5,412 deaths, representing 86% of rise in deaths. In comparison to the first half of the previous year (2021), the first half of 2022 witnessed a sharp rise in the total number of deaths. The first half of 2021 recorded 3,883 deaths. When comparing the preceding period (2021) to the current (2022), there was a sharp increase of 40% in the number of deaths, demonstrating the increasing brutal nature of attacks within the period.

Given the historical data trend and observing the current dynamics of factors driving terrorism in 2022, it is safe to indicate that, deaths resulting from terrorism attacks will continue to rise as all factors that occasioned the high number of deaths for the first half of the year are still present (**See Graph 46**). The implications are that, though the number of attacks may not surpass those recorded in 2021, the number of deaths from attacks will over and above be 40% or higher if sustained efforts are not put in place to disrupt terrorist activities.


**Graph 45: Historical Mid-Year Terrorism Trend: 2017-2022**



**Table 4: Historical data Trend of Terrorism Incidents: 2017-2022**

No	Year	Attacks	Deaths
<b>Historical Data Trend (Complete Year)</b>			
1	Complete Year 2017	1,493	5,098
2	Complete Year 2018	1,119	3,824
3	Complete Year 2019	1,666	6,725
4	Complete Year 2020	2,034	8,631
5	Complete Year 2021	1695	6,571
6	Complete Year 2022		
<b>Historical Data Trend (Mid-Year)</b>			
7	Mid-Year 2017	687	2906
8	Mid-Year 2018	515	2,180
9	Mid-Year 2019	868	3,221
10	Mid-Year 2020	867	4,558
11	Mid-Year 2021	950	3,883
12	Mid-Year 2022	699	5,412
<b>Historical Data Trend (Second Half of the Year)</b>			
13	Second Half 2017	806	2,192
14	Second Half 2018	604	1,644
15	Second Half 2019	798	3,504
16	Second Half 2020	1,167	4,073
17	Second Half 2021	745	2,688
18	Second Half 2022		

**Table 4: Historical sTrend of Terrorism Incidents: 2017-2022**



\*SH= Second Half of the Year

\*\* CY= Fully Completed Year (First Half and Second Half Data)

## 10. COUNTER-TERRORISM RESPONSE GENERATION

Across the continent, Member States and regional bodies have continued to review and adopt series of counter-terrorism measures including field deployments to deal with the threats of violent extremism and terrorism. The operational successes of the field deployments continue to significantly degrade the capacity of terrorist and violent extremist groups. Security forces continue to engage in sustained, deliberate, and planned counter terrorism operations against terrorist hideouts through airstrikes and ground operations. For the period under review, aside the 943 terrorists who were killed in attacks carried out by terrorist groups themselves, a total of 2,362 terrorists were also killed in deliberate counter terrorism operations bringing the number of terrorists eliminated within the period to 3,305. The period, however, witnessed cases of admitted civilian casualties by some National Armies involved in CT operation. The need for CT operations to be conducted in compliance with regional and international humanitarian laws and frameworks as well as respect for human rights must be vigorously pursued to ensure the protection of civilian population in such counter offensive operations.

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has inflicted huge losses and caused setbacks on Boko Haram and ISWAP and has significantly degraded the operational capability of the two groups in the Lake Chad Basin region. The frequency of Boko Haram attacks in Far North Cameroon, Diffa Region of Niger, and North-eastern States of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa have gone down considerably as a result. Similarly, ISWAP's movements within the LCB have also been restricted in a number of instances, forcing the groups to develop operational theatres in other zones outside the LCB. The efforts of member states of the LCB region in defeating the terrorist groups in the areas cannot be overemphasized. The individual states' efforts, combined with that of MNJTF, have yielded some positive results. The extension of MNJTF mandate, if combined with the needed logistical and financial support could further weaken the momentum and cohesion of terrorists in LCB.

In the Sahel, the French Operation Barkhane and European Union Takuba Forces, G5 Sahel Joint Taskforce, MINUSMA as well as the national armies

of the states of the region are the deployments in operation. While National Armies, Operation Barkhane/Takuba and the G5 Sahel Joint Taskforce have mandates to combat terrorism and transnational organized crime, MINUSMA is mandated to help the Malian government stabilize the situation and extend control of the central government of Mali to other parts of the country. Although MINUSMA does not have a counter terrorism mandate, it has nonetheless been inundated by terrorist attacks on its troops, facilities, and equipment. A significant challenge with the cocktail of deployments in the Sahel is therefore the need for better coordination to ensure effectiveness in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel. Ensuring that the G5 Sahel Joint Taskforce is adequately trained and equipped for the task is a crucial part of this effort. Mali remains central and strategically paramount in the fight against terrorists in the Sahel. The Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) intensified their counter offensive against al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates within her territory. The intensification of the CT operations through air and ground operations resulted in the elimination and neutralisation of terrorist elements belonging to JNIM and ISGS. The FAMA exhibited good morale and determination to defeat terrorist groups. Given the resurgence of terrorist activities, regional and international support to Mali and other troops operating in the Sahel region could significantly boost their states of readiness to deal with the threat and therefore improve the security situation in the Sahel.

Counter-terrorism operations in North Africa; particularly in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia; have resulted in the dismantling of several terrorist cells affiliated with IS and AQIM as well as the discovery and destruction of numerous caches of arms and ammunition. In Egypt, a large-scale counter-terrorism operation carried out by the Egyptian army against insurgents in the northern Sinai Peninsula has achieved significant positive results. The CT operation has been intensified in this year since a series of coordinated attacks that have killed many military personnel and civilians, in what appears to be a resurgence of the terrorist activities in the Sinai Peninsula. In southern Libya, where terrorist groups operated most freely, forces aligned with the Libya National Army (LNA) and

those aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA) conducted operations against AQIM and ISIS. Both the GNA and LNA forces undertook CT operations in areas under their control that degraded the capacity and the capabilities of ISIS to carry out devastating attacks in Southern Libya.

In Southern Africa, the force intervention by Rwandan forces, SAMIM, and Mozambican Defence and Security Forces has assisted greatly to reduce the number of attacks across Cabo Delgado province and regain control of major routes which were blocked and controlled by insurgents. However, due to pressure from these forces, insurgents are reportedly retreating into Mtwara region; the southern part of Tanzania bordering Mozambique, as well as to Niassa and Nampula provinces in Northern Mozambique. Apparent lack of coordination among troops operating in either same or different theatres appears to facilitate the insurgents' regrouping strategy. Enhancing operational and strategic coordination between SAMIM, Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM) and Rwandan Forces is a sine qua non in nipping insurgency, violent extremism, and terrorism in the bud in Northern Mozambique.

## 11. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Across the continent, there has been uninterrupted activities of terrorist and violent extremists' activities, resulting in continued devastating atrocities against civilians, security agencies, military establishment, and critical infrastructures. From the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) to the Sahel region, from the East and Horn of Africa to the Great Lakes region, and from the North Africa and the Maghreb to the Southern Africa region, terrorist and violent extremist groups escalated the level of the complexity and sophistication of attacks. The groups demonstrated cohesion and dexterity and exhibited great capability of momentum along their mobility corridors and within the respective territories they control. Despite the numerous CT efforts by state authorities concerned, terrorist structures seem to be resilient. As a result, terrorist groups continue to expand their geographical reach beyond areas originally operated. The reporting period, 1st of January 2022 to 30th of June 2022 recorded 699 terrorist attacks that resulted in 5,412 deaths across Africa. Notwithstanding the level of momentum exhibited by terrorist groups, counter terrorism operations achieved operational successes across the length and breadth of Africa. Preventative approaches and mechanisms that seek to build the resilience of local communities by addressing their vulnerabilities could go a long way to deny terrorist and violent extremists group their freedom of space and movement, thereby culminating into degrading their capabilities and cohesion.

For the period under review, the Sahel belt of West Africa became hotspots of complex and sophisticated attacks. This may be attributed to the political instability in Mali and Burkina Faso, the decrease in military offensives against the hegemony of JNIM and ISGS following the withdrawal and redeployment of Barkhane and Takuba Forces, the cascading effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic, the impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflicts, and the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS on Mali which have aggravated the deteriorating security and humanitarian crisis situations thus making the population more vulnerable to terrorists' recruitment drive . The implication of the political instability in the Sahel on the fight against terrorism and violent extremism cannot be overemphasised.

Given the already volatile security situation, there is the fear that terrorist and violent extremist groups could exploit the chaotic political scene to further entrench their positions and expand their activities to West Africa's Coastal Countries and beyond. The impact of the political crises on the military establishment, coupled with the escalating violent extremism situation, may give violent extremist and terrorist groups the opportunity to further consolidate their authority and influence in the areas where they control and even expand to new geographical areas particularly the littoral states. The G5 Sahel Joint Force and its member states have deployed efforts that have knocked the fighting capacity of terrorist groups operating in the Sahel region to a lesser extent. However, intensification of efforts in the mobilization of additional resources for the joint force, particularly financial and technical support, as well as economic development support aimed at addressing the dire humanitarian situation in the Sahel countries could go a long way to ensure peace, stability, and development in the region. Also, the international and regional actions taken to foster political instability in the Sahel must be carefully crafted and implemented in order not to unduly cause more suffering and misery for an already impoverished population and thereby push them into the hands of terrorist and violent extremist groups. While the return to democratic rule is important, the international responses must be exercised with determination, caution, and discretion. The situation requires flexibility, pragmatism, and skilled diplomacy in order not to exacerbate the already precarious security situation.

The period also witnessed an expansion of the threat of terrorism from the Sahel region toward the Gulf of Guinea countries, particularly Benin and Togo. The terrorist groups appear to be executing a grand strategy of expanding their geographical reach, with the aim of controlling national territories to run criminal economies to sustain their violent activities. Without prejudice to the grand strategy being exhibited by terrorist groups, prevailing multidimensional socioeconomic challenges such as local context-specific community grievances, lack of development, and absence of basic services in border communities, climate change impact,



governance deficit continuum trajectory, herder-farmer conflicts, ownership and access to land, some government policy initiatives, and the humanitarian crisis compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic are vulnerability factors in coastal states that could serve as catalysts to fester a further expansion of violent extremism and terrorism. Violent extremist groups in neighbouring bordering countries appear to be exploiting these vulnerability factors and grievances expressed by local communities to gain influence in West African coastal states. In Benin for instance, the decision to hand over the management of the W-Arly Pendjari Park complex to African parks, a South African non-profit conservation organisation, appears to generate some local grievances. The new management of the park has excluded certain very important stakeholders, especially hunters and livestock herders, thus creating local animosity. This appears to be one of the factors enabling terrorist attacks in and around the park in Benin. Given the heightened risk level, littoral states may have to elevate their respective states of preparedness to effectively respond to the fallout of the insecurity in the Sahel and the consequent humanitarian crises based on regular security risk analysis. The need to find innovative approaches to establishing a new social contract by addressing the concerns of the local communities could serve as a preventative measure to the evolving violent extremism threats. Under the current circumstances, the full operationalisation and the implementation of the Accra Initiative could prove strategically, operationally, and tactically relevant in nipping the threats in the bud. In addition, PVE policies and mechanisms that create a conducive economic atmosphere and a sense of belonging, particularly for young people, to be productive and contribute to the socio-economic development of their communities and countries could help ameliorate the vulnerability factors.

The resurgence of IS in Sinai Peninsula witnessed during the reporting period calls for an urgent need to interrogate the recent escalation in IS activity to understand what is emboldening the group's momentum and resilience. The Egyptian government has heavily invested in the Sinai Peninsula with the aim of getting the population to return to their communities. The investments drive

is also aimed at assuring the communities the government's commitment and ability to protect them against insurgents' atrocities. Indeed, for a long time, the Egyptian Army weakened the capabilities, capacities, and momentum of terrorist elements in the Sinai. The recent surge in terrorist attacks, if not reversed, could derail the government's efforts and put local economic development initiatives in shambles.

The Northern Mozambique Province of Cabo Delgado also experienced the spread of terrorism into other areas previously not affected. Insurgents advanced into the southern districts of Cabo Delgado province, launching sporadic attacks in Ancuabe and Chiure districts within Cabo Delgado and Nampula province - all areas previously unaffected by the nearly five-year old insurgency. The growing foreign military deployments in Mozambique appear to take precedence over soft approaches that could address the underlying root causes of violence in Cabo Delgado. Despite the series of CT operational successes of the security forces, insurgent structures seem to be resilient.

The trajectory of this situation, if left to continue uninhibited, could overtime, develop into entrenched insurgencies and would be extremely difficult to dislodge. The kinetic militaristic approaches if combined with local community-based violent extremism prevention initiatives could help defeat terrorism in Mozambique. While there is the need to do more to support counter-terrorism operations underpinned by actionable intelligence in order to improve security and stability, a human security response approach should inform military concepts of operation. Ensuring future stability will require far more than a purely military approach. Placing emphasis on kinetic militaristic strategies to counter violent extremism and defeat terrorism in Mozambique will not be sufficient unless they are conducted in tandem with addressing the root causes, such as perceived marginalization, poverty and social exclusion, injustice, lack of rule of law and issues relating to governance deficits. A Whole-of-Society approach that involves, amongst others, traditional leaders, community leaders, and youth groups is a worthy pathway of eschewing violence and securing harmonious peaceful living and resilience in local communities




## ACSRT/CAERT

African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism  
Centre Africain d'Études et de Recherche sur le Terrorisme

### About The ACSRT:

The African Centre for The Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established as a structure of the African Union in 2004. The decision to establish the Centre was taken in 2002 as part of the AU Plan of Action (PoA) to Prevent and Combat Terrorism. Its primary role is to assist AU member States build their Counter-Terrorism capacities. Its mandate includes the conduct of research, analysis and studies on the terrorism situation and terrorist groups in Africa, maintaining a terrorism database, centralizing information on terrorism and sharing this with AU Member States. The Centre conducts assessment missions to various AU Member States in order to ascertain their Counter-Terrorism capability and compliance with International Legal instruments and then provide advice on what needs to be done. In its capacity building effort, the Centre conducts seminars, workshops, and training sessions in various aspects of Counterterrorism for Member States and facilitates the drafting of their Counter-Terrorism legislation, strategies, and Plans of Action in accordance with international human rights requirements.



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